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INTRODUCTION
The Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (ASGISA) sets out
the broad socio-economic aspirations of the government.
2
While this contains a few
objectives for Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), the general
framework is to be found in the Information Society and Development (ISAD) policy.
3
This has the ambitious goal:
“… to establish South Africa as an advanced Information Society in which
Information and Information and Communication Technology tools are key drivers
of economic and societal development.”
4
More detailed telecommunications goals are set by the Department of
Communications.
5
These contain a general call for more affordable and accessible
telecommunications for all groups in society and for business. An important theme
is the development of Business Process Outsourcing (BPO) and Call Centres, in
order to create jobs and to boost economic growth.
6
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ABSTRACT: Leased lines are basic building blocks of mobile networks, ISPs and virtual private networks. In South Africa they have
been provided almost exclusively by Telkom SA, the incumbent operator, at comparatively high prices. Those prices were controlled
as part of a general price cap by regulations, but in the absence of either competition or mandatory cost orientation, the level initially
rose then declined (but slowly). Attempts to introduce infrastructure competition were badly managed and delayed. The Electronic
Communication Act 2005 replaces these schemes, but the implementation is slow and has not yet brought changes.
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However, this appears to be held back by skills shortages
7
and by the high cost of
both domestic and international leased lines.
8
Leased lines are a basic input and a
significant factor in the final costs for value-added and Internet service providers.
They are also basic components of corporate networks.
This article considers the implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
the price cap regulations, the roles of the two minor operators and self-provisioning
of infrastructure by value-added service providers. It then reviews the provisions of
the Electronic Communications Act of 2005. Finally conclusions are drawn, with
policy recommendations. 
LEASED LINE SERVICES AND PRICES
Until May 2004 Telkom South Africa was the de jure monopolist and since then the
de facto monopolist in fixed telecommunications, including the international
gateway and the supply of leased lines. With the introduction of limited competition
in downstream markets from the mid-1990s Telkom became the exclusive supplier of
leased lines to:
! Mobile Network Operators (MNOs);
! Value Added Network Services (VANS) providers; and
! Internet Service Providers (ISPs).
As these markets grew it greatly boosted the position of Telkom, taking a significant
share of the revenues generated by the service providers and allowing it to install
new or to upgrade old infrastructure to serve the end-users. Telkom was also the
sole supplier of leased lines for private networks for business, government and other
large organisations. Even in 2007, it retained a monopoly on access to the undersea
cables necessary to provide International Private Leased Circuits (IPLCs).
Latterly some very limited infrastructure competition has been permitted. The
government created Sentech as a multi-media operator, though with a vanishingly
small market share for leased lines.
9
Neotel, the Second Network Operator (SNO),
was delayed by several years in its formation and although finally licensed in 2006,
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7 Philip van Heerden (2006). Networking skills in South Africa: will an increasing shortage hinder growth?
Framington, IDC.
8 Chris Benner, Charley Lewis & Rahmat Omar (2007). The South African call centre industry: a study of strategy,
human resource practices and performance: part of the Global Call Centre Industry Project. Johannesburg,
LINK Centre. 
See also the South African Call Centre Community (SACCOM).
9 Sentech Act, No 63 of 1996. 
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announced its first contract to supply infrastructure only in May 2007.
10
VANS
providers are to be given new classes of licences, with at least some being authorised
to enter the infrastructure market. 
Comparing the prices charged for leased lines by Telkom with those in OECD
countries, South Africa is markedly more expensive (see Figure 1). In 2004, the price
of a basket of lines was three times that of Mexico, four times that of Poland and
eight times that of Turkey. While the fairness of such comparisons can always be
challenged, the very high prices are clearly discouraging businesses considering
locating to South Africa, confirming complaints made by international firms. 
FIGURE 1:  2MBITS/S LEASED LINES: SOUTH AFRICA AND THE OECD IN 200411
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10 Neotel press release. SITA switches to Neotel (24 May 2007). 
http://www.neotel.co.za/neotel/view/neotel/en/page14?oid=40990&sn=Detail
11 Steve Esselaar & Alison Gillwald (2007) 2006 South African ICT sector performance review. LINK Public Policy
Research Paper No 8. Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand.
The original data are from the Telkom SA 2004 price list, taking the prices for Silver Megaline Plus leased lines and
OECD (2006) Communications Outlook 2005 (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).
The OECD basket comprises 100 leased lines of differing distances, but excludes the costs of tail circuits. See also
Teligen (2000) OECD Telecommunications basket definitions as of June 2000 (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development).
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An overall price cap for telecommunications was put in place in the late 1990s, with
leased lines included in the basket. While price increases were gradually brought
under control, prices have only been partially rebalanced. Under the price cap
regime they would never have been fully rebalanced.
12
Without a realistic prospect of
competition there was no reason for Telkom to reduce its monopoly prices. 
The Electronic Communications Act (ECA) signalled the end of the price cap regime.
Chapter 8 of that Act requires operators to lease facilities to other market players,
while Chapter 10 requires the regulator to impose pro-competitive remedies,
including wholesale price controls, on dominant operators. Together, these could see
significant changes.
In February 2007, the Minister of Communications complained about private sector
participation in the market and proposed to “twist its arm”, apparently with a view
to increasing its participation and in this way to reduce prices.
13
This appears not
only to go against international experience, but also commitments made at the World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to create an enabling environment and
regulatory certainty.
14
A failure to understand the importance of appropriate market
conditions combined with ad hoc decision-making might explain some of the
problems of the telecommunications sector. 
The United States Trade Representative (USTR), acting on behalf of carriers based
in the US and under a direction from the US Congress, has criticised the behaviour
of the South African government, the regulator and Telkom in a series of
complaints.
15
In 2001, the USTR complained of the failure by Telkom to supply leased
lines to service providers because Telkom took the view that the use  to which they
were being put was infringing its monopoly on basic services. In 2002, the USTR
report continued to highlight the disadvantages rivals to Telkom faced under the
regulatory regime. In 2003, it argued that South Africa was failing to meet a WTO
commitment to allow the resale of basic services. In 2004, it complained about the
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12 Dr Celli, head of regulatory affairs for Telkom, speaking on 17 May 2007 at the ICASA hearing on Wholesale Call
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13 Linda Ensor. Private sector ‘must be part of telephone unbundling’ Business Day 21 February 2007.
http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx%5C?ID=BD4A391243
14 Item 14 of the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society (WSIS-05/TUNIS/DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E): “Therefore,
governments should take action, in the framework of national development policies, in order to support an enabling
and competitive environment for the necessary investment in ICT infrastructure and for the development of new
services.”
15 http://www.ustr.gov/Trade_Sectors/Telecom-E-commerce/Section_1377/Section_Index.html
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undermining of the independence of the NRA and the need to permit resale of basic
services. Thereafter, South Africa escaped criticism. It was also in 2004 that SBC
sold its holding in Telkom SA, perhaps removing the incentive for its domestic rivals
in the US to lobby against it.
16
AT&T, then a separate firm, gradually dropped out of
the South African market, while Verizon simply did not complain. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1996
For a decade the primary legislation was the Telecommunications Act.
17
While it has
recently been repealed and replaced by the Electronic Communications Act, many
elements of the old legislative framework remain as transitional measures, while
ICASA replaces the licences and created new regulations.
18 
Article 45 of the Telecommunications Act authorised the Minister to adopt price
regulations for ‘fields’ where there was no or insufficient competition.
19 
In common
with many countries, prices had historically been determined administratively and
were frequently out of line with costs. In some instances the costs would not even
have been known. 
The intention to use a “price cap” was announced in the 1996 White Paper.
20
This was
to allow Telkom to bring prices more closely in line with costs, to eliminate cross-
subsidies, while keeping rises below the level of inflation. In May 1997, the Minister
of Communications made a direction for the use of a price cap.
21
He specified that it
should not have a “materially adverse” effect on the ability of Telkom to achieve its
roll-out targets. Initially, the cap was not binding, merely an obligation to take all
reasonable steps.  
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16 Company news: SBC sells shares in Telkom South Africa. New York Times, 19 June 2004.
17 Telecommunications Act, No 103 of 1996 as amended 2001.
18 The NRA was initially the South Africa Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (SATRA). This was later merged
with the broadcasting regulator to become the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA). See
the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act of 2000 (No 13 of 2000). 
19 Article 45 (2) The manner of determining fees and charges shall be prescribed only in respect of fields where no or
insufficient competition exists: Provided that within 12 months after the date of commencement of this Act, the
Minister shall determine such fees and charges in respect of Telkom, and such fees and charges shall be in force until
the third anniversary of the date on which the Minister issued a licence to Telkom in accordance with section 36(1)
20 Ministry for Posts, Telecommunications and Broadcasting. 1996. White Paper on Telecommunications Policy.
Pretoria. Government Gazette No 16995, 13 March, 1996.
21 Minister for Posts, Telecommunication and Broadcasting. Notice 773. Policy Direction Number One on fees and
charges for telecommunication services. Government Gazette No 17984, 7 May 1997.
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The Minister specified the formula for price changes to apply for a period of three
years (see below), setting the productivity factor to be 1.5%.
22
The prices of
“elements” in the basket were permitted to be raised by not more then 20% above the
generally permitted rate. The published prices were to be the maximum that could
be charged and were subject to the principle of non-discrimination, which Telkom
took to mean minimal and identical discounts for only its very largest customers.
Leased lines were one “element” in an overall basket of telecommunications
services, though itself comprising many tens of individual prices. However, value-
added services were excluded from the basket.
The effect was to permit a massive increase in the price of leased lines, close to the
maximum permissible (see Table 1). Looking back, the Independent
Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) noted that:
“This suggests that either this service was previously greatly under-priced, or that
Telkom sees market advantage in raising the price of this type of facility on which
competitors to its own services business currently depend.”
23
There was no justification given by Telkom in terms of any rise in the underlying
costs. It appears to have been an exercise in market power, with the upstream
supplier taking profits from downstream VANS, ISPs, MNOs and the owners of
private network operators.
TABLE 1: PRICE INCREASES FOR 2MBITS/SEC LEASED LINES 24
1998 1999 2000 Cumulative Deflated 
% % % increase by CPI
Megaline C Tariff 25.5 24.6 22.9 92.2 74.2
The Telecommunications Amendment Act extended the price control regime from
the initial three years into a rolling arrangement.
25
A sequence of regulations on
price controls was adopted under the amended Act (see Annexe 1). Section 96 of the
Act gave the Authority a general power to propose regulations, though these could
only be adopted by the Minister who had and who exercised the power to amend
such proposals. 
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22 Notice 772 Ministerial determination on fees and charges. Government Gazette No 17984, 7 May 1997.
23 Paragraph 5.5 in Government Gazette No 21925.
24 Table 1 from Government Gazette No 21925. 
25 Telecommunications Amendment Act (No 64 of 2001) Government Gazette No 22889 (30 November 2001).
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At the end of 2000, ICASA launched a consultation on fees and charges for
telecommunications services.
26
It argued that the use of a price cap was in line with
international practice and would help to rebalance tariffs. Moreover, it allowed
Telkom, if it were to make efficiency savings, to keep the balance as profits.
ICASA noted that most respondents felt that there was “considerable scope for
improvement” in the application of the price controls and an urgent need for greater
downward pressure, especially on residential prices, in order to offset the effects of
rebalancing.
27
It failed to note that the absence of competition meant there was little
pressure on or incentives for Telkom to make price reductions.
Comments had also been made by service providers about the need for the
development of a wholesale market, with significant discounts for bulk purchasers.
28
This continued to prove a failing in the South African market structure.
ICASA proposed to reduce from 20% to 5% the maximum price increase permitted
for any element of the basket – that is over and above the basket price increase –
with a separate sub-basket for consumers in order to protect them from excessive
price rises.
29
The productivity factor was to be 5%, in contrast to the suggestion by
Telkom of 0%, because it had already achieved “virtually all efficiency improvements
possible”.
30
Although the regulations were adopted by the Minister, the productivity
factor was reduced to 1.5%. 
31
By comparison with other countries, the productivity factors have been very low, more
typical values would be 5 to 10 %. Indeed in its consultation ICASA conceded that 1.5%
was “fairly undemanding”.
32 
One justification claimed by Telkom for the low productivity
factor was the commitment to expand its fixed network by 2.7 million lines by May 2002,
part of the agreement to continue its exclusivity. Yet, almost two-thirds of these lines
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26 General Notice 4715. Notice in respect of a review of fees and charges in the public switched telecommunications
sector. Government Gazette No 21925, 22 December 2000. 
27 General Notice 886 of 2001: ICASA Findings and conclusions on the review of rate regime in the public switched
telecommunications sector. Government Gazette No 22240, 23 April 2001.
28 Paragraph 2.20.1 of Government Gazette 22240. 
29 General Notice 887 of 2001: ICASA. Notice of intention to make regulations on fees and charges in the public
switched telecommunications sector. Government Gazette No 22241, 23 April 2001.
30 Paragraphs 2.7.1 and 2.14 of Government Gazette 22240 above.
31 Government Notice No R. 1248. Regulations: fees and charges in the public switched telecommunications sector.
Government Gazette No 22870. 26 November 2001.
32 Paragraph 13.2 in Government Gazette No 21925 above.
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were subsequently disconnected.
33
Moreover, by not facing competition it gained
considerable economic benefits. A more significant factor appears to have been the
lobbying efforts of Telkom, arguing it needed to report substantial profits – a large part
of which was paid to the government in dividends.
Although ICASA had published its draft price regulation in April 2001, it was not
immediately adopted by the Minister. Acting in the resulting regulatory vacuum,
Telkom implemented a tariff increase on its own authority, using the CPI forecast
for January 2002 of 5.5% and a productivity factor of zero%. This gave it an
overall 5.5% price increase, as against the 2.9% it would have been allowed under
the draft regulations.
34
The regulation was finally adopted by the Minister at the end of November 2001, but
ignored by Telkom. ICASA applied to the High Court, asking that the price increases
announced by Telkom be blocked as a matter of urgency. The court held the balance
of convenience to lie with Telkom. Anything collected above the permitted rates
could be repaid, whereas suspending the price increases would have disrupted the
business of Telkom and service providers.
35
Telkom separately sought a review of the
price regulations. 
The matter was settled out of court in June 2002, with both parties withdrawing their
actions and with ICASA accepting the price increases. In 2003 and 2004 Telkom
undertook to forfeit a total of ZAR320 million in permissible tariff increases. It also
introduced a “lifeline” system under which defaulting customers would continue to
receive incoming calls and make outgoing calls to emergency numbers though only
if they paid the monthly line rental charge.
36
The Price Control Regulations were revised in 2002, with the primary change
being the proposal by ICASA that the “carry over” of unused  increase be limited
to one year.
37
In late 2002, Telkom filed proposals for an overall price increase of 9.5%, but with an
increase of 12.5% for basic service charges – within the permitted 5% limit above the
overall price increase. This was severely criticised by William Melody, who re-iterated
85
the southern african journal of information and communication issue 8 2007
33 See Telkom Annual Report (2001).
34 Taking the Telkom revenues in 2002 to be R 33 970 million, and assuming conservatively that 75% was under the
price cap, then taking 2.6% of that, the benefit to Telkom would have been R662 million in 2003. 
35 ICASA v Telkom SA Ltd & another (2005) JOL 15024 (T) Case No 33507/01, 31 December 2001.
36 Telkom SA Ltd. Press release. 6 June 2002.
37 ICASA. General Notice 1409. Notice of intention to make regulations. Government Gazette No 23726, 7 August
2002. The Minister’s adopted version was published in Government Gazette No 23986, 24 October 2002.
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the complaint that the productivity factor was very low by global standards and out
of line with the labour efficiency gains being reported by Telkom (see below).
38
In 2004, ICASA undertook another consultation on the price regulations, having for
the first time obtained the Telkom regulatory accounts.
39
The time it proposed a
productivity factor of 4% for 2005.
40
It held public hearings in mid-December, then in
February 2005 published draft regulations.
41
The text was later revised to show the
derivation of the 3.5% productivity factor.
42
The Minister published revised price regulations in July 2005 covering the final
period from August 2005 to July 2008.
43
The list price changes of a small selection of leased line pricing elements are shown
in Figure 2. Although generally downwards, the range of changes in the prices is
quite wide, with there being no consistent pattern and with very little advantage
being taken of the capacity to raise prices. Any reductions have to be seen against
the high starting point of the charges. 
FIGURE 2: CHANGES IN LEASED LINE PRICE ELEMENTS AS INDEX NUMBERS
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38 William Melody (2002) Assessing Telkom’s 2003 price increase proposal: price cap regulation as a test of progress
in South African telecom reform, and e-economy development. LINK Centre Policy Research Paper No 2,
Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand.
39 CASA. Notice 2490. Inviting representations with regard to the review of Telkom’s price control. Government
Gazette No 26977, 8 November 2004.
40 ICASA. Notice 2491. Notice of intention to make regulation. Government Gazette No 26979, 9 November 2004. 
41 ICASA. Notice 209.  Inviting representations with regard to the review of Telkom’s price control. Government
Gazette No 27277, 9 February 2005. 
42 ICASA. Notice 246.  Inviting representations with regard to the review of Telkom’s price control. Government
Gazette No 27284, 18 February 2005.
43 Government Notice R. 675, Regulations approved under section 96 (6) published in Government Gazette No
27772, 2 July 2005. Some corrections were published in Government Notice R 799, Amending regulations.
Government Gazette No 27875, 4 August 2005.
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While the prices charged by Telkom are a matter of record, the revenues from these
services are not. Telkom filed its revenues with ICASA alongside the proposed price
changes – though these were confidential and have never been published. ICASA has
seldom made a public statement that it had approved a price increase, rather the 
15- day period had been allowed to lapse and the new prices approved by default. 
For most of the period of the price cap ICASA lacked regulatory accounts from
Telkom and thus was unable to verify the calculations.
44
It could only have taken the
revenues on trust and thus their conformity with the regulations. Even with the
regulatory accounts it is an extremely complex exercise to verify that the equation
has been correctly applied. Moreover, to do so in 15 days is a considerable and,
perhaps, impossible challenge. 
The origin of price-cap regulation was in the United Kingdom, where it was
introduced in 1984, to be followed by many other countries, often with additional
complications to the initially simple model.
45
It was not seen as a standalone tool, but
to be used in coordination with other policies, notably the introduction of
competition.
46
Price-caps have generally achieved the social equity objectives of
constraining price increases for consumers. In the US, price cap regulation was
found to generate responses from operators largely consistent with economic theory
– prices fell, productivity rose and more modern infrastructure was deployed. 
47
In South Africa, the lack of real or prospective competition in most areas meant
that Telkom had few incentives to rebalance its prices. In leased lines competition
was only to emerge in 2007 on the core inter-city routes, but was still absent from
tail circuits. 
THE PRICE CAP
The price control regulation imposed on Telkom is shown in Equation 1: 
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44 The obligation to provide regulatory accounts is contained in the Telkom Licence. 
45 M . Beesley & S . Littlechild (1989) The regulation of privatised monopolies in the United Kingdom.
The RAND Journal of Economics 20 (3) pp. 454-472.
46 OECD. 1995. Price caps for telecommunications: policies and experiences. ICCP No 37. Paris, Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development.
47 Jaison Abel. (2000). The performance of the state telecommunications industry under price-cap regulation: an
assessment of the empirical evidence. NRRI 00-14. (Columbus, National Regulatory Research Institute)
(1)
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The right hand side of the equation is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) less a
productivity factor specified by the Minister of Communications (see Table 2). The
equation was modified in 2001 to allow any unused price increase to be carried over
into the next year. 
TABLE 2: CPI AND PRODUCTIVITY FACTORS48




January to 6.8 7.6 7.5 8.1 6.2 8.9 4.7 3.8 3.8
January
September to 7.5 7.5 7.6 6.2 9.4 5.8 3.8 4.7 3.8
September
Productivity 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 3.5
factor (X)
The left hand side of Equation 1 is the ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the Revenue
Change (RC) divided by the total Reported Revenue (RR) for all the items in the
basket. For each basket “element” the Revenue Change is determined as the Reported
Revenue multiplied by the proposed percentage price change ( P) for that element. 
The total Revenue Change (RC) is then the sum of the changes of the n elements in
the basket.
Nominal revenues for the next year are generated by assuming no change in
demand, or discounting practice, only a change in prices. These revenue changes
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48 A change was made from using a forecast CPI of January to January, which had tended to overstate inflation, to use
the data for the previous year from September to September.
49 Consumer Price Index (P0141.1).  Metropolitan and other urban areas – Core index.
(2)
(3)
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are then aggregated by simple addition. The ratio is calculated as the total
change in revenue divided by the total current revenues and this is tested using
Equation 1. 
Individual basket ‘elements’ are separately tested against a higher figure of 5% more
than in Equation 1. So that, for example, leased lines cannot rise by more than 5%
more than CPI-X, typically around 2% or 3%, making a ceiling of around 7% or 8%
price increase. 
Schedule A of the Price Control Regulation of 2001 specified the composition of the
basket of charges of which Section 2.6 identified point-to-point leased circuits,
including the fixed rental and any distance/capacity dependent elements used in
private networks and for private circuits. Sections 1.3 and 2.3 refer to the
installation and rental charges for 2Mbits/sec “digital lines”.
50
The basket expressly
excludes value-added services. Telkom access circuits, for example, for its VPN
Supreme service are excluded from the basket, though not those for Internet access
or frame relay.
Surprisingly, the basket includes Telex and X.25 (Saponet-P), which would
ordinarily be considered to be obsolete services. The risk of Telkom raising these
prices would seem slight and might in any event encourage customers to move to
more efficient technologies. Their inclusion distorts the basket, though the
revenues are now very low.
If a price increase is not used for leased lines or if the prices are reduced, then the
corresponding quota of revenue can be used in increasing the price of other services,
provided the results conform to the two conditions. The scale of any such
contribution would depend on the size of the total revenues for leased lines and any
price change. If say, leased line prices were to be reduced by 5% overall, then the
contribution available to raise other prices would be the received revenues for
leased lines multiplied by (CPI-X) + 5%. 
The same approach is taken at lower levels. For leased lines this means that the
various elements that comprise point-to-point leased lines are added together,
weighted by the unpublished volume of the revenues, together with their proposed
price changes. 
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ADMINISTERED PRICES
President Mbeki in a speech to Parliament recognised the importance for society and
the economy of those prices controlled by government.
51
The issue was discussed by
the cabinet during 2004, with Statistics South Africa (StatsSA) being directed to
create an index of administered and regulated prices.
52
Figure 3 shows the CPI, the
CPI-X (ie excluding mortgage interest payments), and the CPI-X-R for regulated
prices, which includes telecommunications charges. 
FIGURE 3:  CPIS FOR HISTORICAL METROPOLITAN AREAS (100 = 2000)
The National Treasury conducted a review of administered prices across several
sectors.
53




“It is clearly very unlikely that efficient prices will emerge from the current
processes for setting administered prices in the telecommunications sector.”
55
It described the regulatory network and the interplay of the various actors (see
Figure 4). 
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51 Address of the President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, at the Second Joint sitting of the third Democratic
Parliament, Cape Town, 11 February 2005. http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2005/05021110501001.htm
52 For the results, see, for example,
http://www.statssa.gov.za/PublicationsHTML/P0141February2007/html/P0141February2007_14.html
53 Economic and employment cluster: parliamentary media briefing by Minister of Trade and Industry, Minister M
Mpahlwa 24 May 2004.  http://www.info.gov.za/speeches/2004/04052413151001.htm
54 James Hodge (2004) Administered prices: telecommunications. Pretoria, National Treasury. 
http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/epir/telecomm.pdf
55 David Storer & Ethel Teljeur (2004) Administered prices: executive report: a report for National Treasury. Pretoria,
National Treasury.  http://www.treasury.gov.za/documents/epir/Summary%20of%20sector%20reports.pdf
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FIGURE 4:  FORCES CONSTRAINING PRICE SETTING56
The role of the Minister of Communications was central to the process, since the
legislation required her consent for the promulgation of any regulations and her
invitation to apply for licences that involved the construction of infrastructure and
thus compete with the incumbent. Telkom lobbied the minister and also used the
asymmetry of information to strengthen its position vis-à-vis the regulator.
At the instigation of the Deputy Minister, the Department of Communications
organised two colloquia on telecommunications prices in July and October 2005.
57
These addressed primarily retail prices, but noted the following:
! the local loop had to be either unbundled or opened for shared access;
! self-provisioning of VANS providers had to be revisited;
! ownership or custody of SAT-3 had to be re-examined and access expanded;
! the wholesale rate on line rentals for ISPs and the question of leased line costs
needed urgent attention.
In her budget speech in 2006, the Minister announced a committee to examine local
loop unbundling.
58
One year later, the Minister announced a “policy decision” that
unbundling be completed by November 2011.
59
Further details were set out in the
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56 Hodge (2004) Figure 1 page 10. 
57 http://www.doc.gov.za/_colloquium/mainframe.htm
58 Government Information Service. Press release. Communications Minister Dr Ivy Matsepe-Cassaburri announces
key policy decisions for information and communication technology (ICT) sector. 25 May 2006. 
59 Budget vote speech. The Minister of Communications Dr Ivy Matsepe-Casaburri National Assembly 24 May 2007,
Pretoria, Department of Communications. 
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Government Gazette,
60
with the background in the report of the Local Loop
Unbundling Committee (LLUC).
61
However, the implementation would depend on the
analysis of the relevant market to be conducted by ICASA and any regulations. 
TELKOM SA
As with many other incumbent operators, the pre-history of Telkom was as a
converged provider of posts and telecommunications. It retains many properties
and much of the infrastructure from that past. In the case of South Africa this has
a heightened political significance, since Telkom closely followed the policies of
the apartheid regime, doing little to serve the historically disadvantaged
populations.
62
Although Telkom had lobbied ministers and the regulators with arguments in favour
of a low productivity factor, it told a very different story to the financial markets in
its annual reports and other statements. In 2000, it reported 4-year compound
annual growth rates of 19 % in revenue per employee, 14% in operating profit per
employee and 15% in value created per employee (see Table 3). In 2000 it stated that
“Telkom’s ongoing restructuring programme is paying off richly with striking
improvements in productivity and efficiency during the past year”.
63
TABLE 3: TELKOM PRODUCTIVITY FACTORS (1996-2000) 64
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Average number 57 501 57 496 57 813 60 613 57 877
of employees
Revenue per 227 666 275 550 332 417 374 090 461 664
employee (ZAR)
Operating profit per 85 512 110 842 114 818 118 299 147 012
employee (ZAR)
Value created per 161 962 207 423 223 842 230 446 285 744
employee (ZAR)
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60 Government Notice 469. Electronic Communications Act (36/2005): Notice inviting comments on proposed policies
and policy directions. Government Gazette No 29923, 25 May 2007. 
61 Local Loop Unbundling Committee (2007). Final Report (Pretoria, Department of Communications). 
62 Robert Horwitz (2001) Communication and democratic reform in South Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge
University Press). 
Myron Zlotnick (1999) Telecommunications monopoly in South Africa – some human rights aspects and
options for future regulation. Journal of African Law 43 (2) 214-233.
63 Telkom Group Annual Report (2000), CEO Review – cover page. 
64 Telkom Annual Report (2000), page 73. 
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The advances did not stop then. Table 4 shows the further improvements in
efficiency. One part of this was achieved by the successful rollout of workforce
management software: 
The field force team, which delivers service to customers, achieved significant
savings through a reduction of the following: the vehicle fleet (6.0%), dispatches due
to a reduction in repeat faults, theft and breakage incidents and the cost of fixed-line
materials and maintenance (16%).
65
Telkom attributed its successes to having invested in the right skills and having
developed a “performance driven culture” in both its management and workforce.
66
TABLE 4: TELKOM SA PERFORMANCE (2002-2006)67
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Revenue (ZAR m)
fixed 27 976 29 635 31 004 31 457 32 749 33 295
mobile 8 075 9 890 11 428 13 657 17 021 20 573
Operating profit (ZAR m)
fixed 2 425 4 348 6 724 8 021 10 242 9 040
mobile 1 816 2 166 2 614 3 240 4 435 5 430
Fixed access lines 
Number (thousands) 4 762 4 709 4 680 4 726 4 708 4 642
Revenue per line (ZAR) 4 882 5 157 5 341 5 250 5 304 5 276
Employees 39 444 35 361 32 358 28 972 25 575 25 864
Lines per employee 121 133 145 163 184 180
Note: Mobile figures represent one half of Vodacom totals attributable to Telkom. 
The sharp rise in the contribution of mobile revenues from Vodacom is striking, with the
fixed business almost stagnating, especially in the latter years. Had there been some
competition, Telkom might have been obliged to improve its growth in fixed markets. 
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65 Telkom SA Limited Group Annual Results for the year ended 31 March 2004.
66 Telkom Group Annual Report (2002), p. 23.
67 Compiled from the following: 
Five-year operational review for the years ended March 31, p. 89 of Telkom Annual Report (2006).
Three-year financial review for the years ended March 31, p. 122 of Telkom Annual Report (2006).
Financial Review, page 50ff of Telkom Annual Report (2003). 
Telkom Group provisional annual results – March 2007, pp. 5 & 17. 
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WHOLESALE SUPPLY
Telkom has lagged other incumbent operators in its continued reliance on leased
lines, representing more than 20% of its fixed network revenues. It is only very
recently that managed network services have taken off, with steep growth in the
lease of IP-VPNs.  
Telkom provides point-to-point leased lines both for retail and for resale. However, it
consistently pressed customers to obtain these lines directly, rather than through
their VANS providers. Telkom struggled to avoid the creation of a wholesale market
in which it would have to offer significant discounts to downstream suppliers and
rivals. Providers would obtain a “letter of agency” from the end-user to authorise
them to procure and to maintain the lines, managing the relationship with Telkom,
while the customers had only to pay the invoices. 
In pricing access lines to some of its own services, Telkom offered ‘flat rate’ or distance
independent tariffs. For example, Diginet line rental had two sets of tariffs, one for use
as leased lines and the other for Telkom services, as access lines to Frame Express and
South Africa Internet eXchange (SAIX). For Diginet-Plus at 2Mbps:
68
! FrameExpress/SAIX ZAR3 054 
! leased line services ZAR2 129 plus (distance in km x ZAR152.21)
There were approximately 50 Points of Presence (POPs) for SAIX, at least as many
as the four largest rival VANS put together, giving it a considerable competitive
advantage. SAIX is a multi-location platform, rather than a single point of traffic
interchange. 
Figure 5 shows a Telkom forecast of the future migration amongst data services. The
WiMax and DSL sections are mostly residential and for individual customers and so
can be discounted for the business telecommunications market. However, the
collapse of frame relay, the decline of Diginet and the rise of Ethernet are global
trends in business telecommunications.
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68 Tables A.2.9.3 and A.2.9.4 in Telkom Tariff list 1 August 2006. The rate for leased line services applies up to 50km,
with different rates applying at longer distances. 
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FIGURE 5: DATA SERVICE MIGRATION FORECAST69
Telkom has not been required by ICASA to publish quality of service data and in
particular evidence of its performance for different downstream providers. However,
it has offered a small amount of information in its reports to the SEC (see table 5).
In 2005, Telkom changed the measures reported (see table 6), making more difficult
comparisons over time and with operators in other countries. Without considerably
more data and without it being audited, it is impossible to assess the accusations
made against Telkom that it discriminates in favour of its own direct customers and
against those of VANS and ISPs.
TABLE 5: QUALITY OF SERVICE FOR FINANCIAL YEARS 2001 TO 200470
2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean time to install (days) 
71
2Mb data 53 35 26 20
subrates data 28 23 20 14
Mean time to repair (hours)
2Mb leased lines 3 3 3 3
subrate leased lines 6 6 4 4
Service measures (number of faults) 
per 1 000 subrates 1 053 919 847 880
per 1 000 2Mb 718 925 669 498
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69 Taken from an analyst presentation by Steven Hayward (Managing Executive Retail Marketing). Filed by Telkom
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) as a 6-K report on 10 April 2007. 
70 Page 54, of Form 20-F Telkom SA Ltd 2003. Page 63 of 2004. 
71 In the 2004 financial year, Telkom revised the installation measures from a mean to an average. On the original basis,
the average times to install 2Mb data and subrates data in 2004 would have been 19 and 17 days, respectively. 
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The fault rates have been affected by theft and vandalism, despite an increased
number of alarms, security patrols and the like. Telkom has been reduced to encasing
copper cable routes in concrete, installing security manhole lids, burying overhead
cables and optic fibre and upgrading copper to fibre in order to reduce theft. 
TABLE 6: QUALITY OF SERVICE FOR FINANCIAL YEARS 2004 TO 200772
2004 2005 2006 2007
Business voice
Installed in 5 days 85% 68% 63% 81%
Faults per 1 000 lines 295 287 300 328
Cleared in 24 hours 94% 62% 61% 66%
Data subrates
Installed in 10 days 65% 75% 40% 41%
Faults per 1 000 lines 880 756 801 870
Cleared in 24 hours 99% 97% 92% 84%
ADSL business
Installed in 20 days 86% 84% 56% 76%
Faults per 1 000 lines 624 505 480 575
Cleared in 24 hours 80% 79% 54% 33%
The provision of International Private Leased Circuits (IPLCs) has been limited to
Telkom, through its monopoly on access to the undersea cables and thus the
provision of International Private Leased Circuits (IPLCs). It has derived
considerable revenues because of the high prices it has been able to charge.  
The only undersea cable with landing stations in South Africa is variously known as:
! West Africa Submarine Cable (WASC); 
! Southern Africa Telecommunications 3 (SAT-3);
73
! South Africa Far East (SAFE). 
These land at Melkbosstrand and Mtunzini, going to Portugal and India, with onward
connections to other cables. All connections in South Africa are made through the
international exchange in Johannesburg where the Points of Presence of the global
network service providers (eg  BT, Orange and Verizon) are consequently to be found. 
SAT-3 has been upgraded from time to time, greatly increasing its capacity at
96
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72 P. 68 of Form 20-F Telkom SA Ltd (2006) and p. 74 of Form 20-F Telkom SA Ltd (2007). 
73 SAT-2 still exists with its limited capacity, generally used as back-up in the event of a breakage of SAT-3.
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relatively modest additional cost.
74
However, these improvements have only been
partially reflected in the prices charged to customers, because of the absence of
competitive access to the increased capacity (see Figure 6). Much of the cable
capacity is used as back-up for the route from Europe to India, with 5Gbps of
capacity at the Cochin landing station for SAFE, which can connect to Bangalore. 
In an interview in the Financial Times, President Mbeki criticised the excessive
charges made by Telkom for use of the undersea cable.
75 
Almost immediately, Papi
Molotsane resigned as Chief Executive Officer of Telkom SA.
76
A few weeks later,
Telkom reduced the price of its International Private Leased Circuits (IPLCs) by up
to 30%.
77
This was on the eve of the announcement by the Minister that the regulator
must designate the cable landing stations as essential facilities and open access to
other operators, in effect opening the undersea cables.
78
FIGURE 6: MONTHLY CHANGES FOR 1.5MBPS IPLCS (ZAR)
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74 Alcatel (2002) Press release: Alcatel is awarded US$ 33 million contract to upgrade SAT-3/WASC with terrestrial and
submarine optical solutions (23 April 2002).
Alcatel (2005) Press release: Alcatel refuerza las comunicaciones entre Africa, Europa y Asia con una importante
actualización de las redes submarinas (1 September 2005).
75 The cable in question is the SAT-3. Southern Africa Telecommunications 3. The interview was: 
Lionel Barber, editor of the Financial Times, and Alec Russell, Southern Africa correspondent, interviewed
President Thabo Mbeki in his official residence in Pretoria on Sunday 1 April. Financial Times published: 3 April
2007 08:13. 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/c5b97158-e12f-11db-bd73-000b5df10621.html
76 Paul Vecchiato. Telkom’s CEO quits. IT Web,  5 April 2007. 
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/telecoms/2007/0704052045.asp
77 Hilton Tarrant. Telkom slashes international bandwidth prices. Money Web, 22 May 2007. 
http://www.moneyweb.co.za/mw/view/mw/en/page39?oid=92631&sn=Detail
78 Government Notice 469. Electronic Communications Act (36/2005): Notice inviting comments on proposed policies
and policy directions. Government Gazette No 29923, 25 May 2007. 
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The high costs of IPLCs are largely attributable to the half circuit provided by
Telkom. The ratio of half-circuit prices from Africa to North Atlantic destinations has
been stated as, at least, 4:1 and perhaps as high as 8:1. The cost of the South African
half-circuit is much more expensive than the cost of the European or North America
half-circuit.
79
The club or consortium agreement on the SAT-3 cable ended in May 2007, though no
information is available about the future arrangements. Other cable projects have
been discussed, but nothing is expected to be operational until 2009 or later. 
TWO MINOR PLAYERS
Sentech was created by Act of Parliament in 1996.
80
It was given two
telecommunications licences, one as a carriers’ carrier, providing limited wholesale
international services, and the other as a multi-media carrier, supplying business
and consumer broadband services. 
Sentech offers a service equivalent to a leased line under the BizNet Xpress brand









As of early 2007 Sentech counted some tens of lines, less than 0.1% of comparable
lines provided by Telkom. Moreover, some of these were being used for trials by
service providers.
The inability of Sentech to grow in the business market and with a rival service
available from Neotel and soon, possibly others, suggests it has substantially failed
98
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79 Interviews with service providers. 
See also: Tracy Cohen & Russell Southwood (2004) An overview of VoIP regulation in Africa: policy responses and
proposals. London, Commonwealth Telecommunications Organisation. 
80 Sentech Act 1996.  No 63 of 1996.
81 This is sold under the BizNet Xpress brand offering a circuit equivalent to a leased line from 96Kbits/sec to 
2M bits/sec, it uses the 3.5GHz band with a range of up to 25km. Sentech has less than one dozen base stations.  
http://www.sentech.co.za/index.php?module=ContentExpress&func=display&ceid=238
See, for example, the press release: Sentech further expands broadband wireless network with Cambridge
Broadband’s VectaStar equipment. Cambridge Broadband Networks, 9 November 2005. 
http://www.cambridgebroadband.com/mi09nov05.htm
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as a supplier to corporations and VANS. It is doubtful that any potential corporate
customer would view Sentech as a plausible supplier over the medium term.
Moreover, Sentech faces massive financial and technical challenges in the
switchover from analogue to digital television and in meeting the heavy network
demands associated with the coverage of the FIFA World Cup in 2010. 
The creation of Neotel as the Second Network Operator (SNO) has been a protracted
and painful process. The search for a ‘strategic investor’ took several years, until the
Tata Group was found.
82
The various ‘partners’ fought with each other in private, in
public and sometimes in the courts. The Minister pushed together two unwilling
consortia, adding to the problems. Each delay meant that the business plan had to
be revisited.
From extensive press briefings by Neotel and Telkom, there seems to be some
measure of agreement that the former will be able to take no more than 10% market
share from Telkom, across the fixed telecommunications market. This has been
reduced from 15% and the period required has been extended from three to five
years. The first contract was with the State Information Technology Agency (SITA)
for the provision of a bandwidth on demand service for Government Common Core
Network (GCCN).
83
Neotel has acquired certain assets from Transtel and Eskom and is leasing others
through InfraCo, a new state-owned enterprise.
84
This gives it a core network, though
often far from the locations where business customers are to be found. Neotel has
admitted it will have to rely on Telkom for tail circuits to reach customers in most
locations.
85
This is consistent with experience from other countries where the local
access network of the incumbent operator remains an essential facility for the
supply of tail circuits for business customers. The cost of constructing dedicated
links to specific locations offers very few economies of scale to new entrants.
Incumbent operators have general networks that are already close to almost all
business locations. 
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82 The Tata Group is a very large conglomerate based in India, but with global interests. It has substantial involvement
in telecommunications through VSNL International. 
83 Neotel was to provide optical fibre transmission links to the main sites using STM-1 or STM-4 interfaces.
Press Release. SITA switches to Neotel. 24 May 2007.
84 Department of Public Enterprise. Government Notice 567: Notice inviting comments on a proposal to introduce the
Broadband Infraco Bill. Government Gazette No 29879, 11 May 2007.
This became the Broadband Infraco Act, No 33 of 2007.
85 Competition Tribunal (2007) Telkom SA Ltd and Business Connexion Group Ltd. Case No: 51/LM/Jun06,  Pretoria,
Competition Tribunal.
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The managed introduction of additional fixed network operators has been
characterised by weakness and delay. Interventions by ministers have created
uncertainty and sometimes confusion. The appearance of Infraco was without any
prior public debate and with unclear and shifting objectives. 
SELF-PROVISIONING
The Minister announced steps towards further liberalisation, lifting restrictions in
the Telecommunications Act, to take effect from February 2005.
86
In particular, VANS
licensees were to be allowed to carry voice traffic. 
Telkom had historically insisted on its right to be the exclusive supplier of any
telecommunications capacity that crossed the boundary of any property or carried
voice telephony.
87
MNOs and VANS licensees were now to be allowed to self-provide
telecommunication facilities or to obtain them from any other operator licensed to
provide such facilities, including other MNOs and VANS licensees. The prohibition on
the resale of excess capacity was lifted, including private or corporate networks.
Neotel was given the same status as Telkom as a supplier of infrastructure. 
Telkom has supplied a great many leased lines to the mobile network operators, with
all three MNOs being substantial customers (see Figure 7). The operators had been
bound to use leased lines provided by Telkom.
88
These had always been provided
below list price, but the discounts were substantially increased just when the MNOs
were considering exercising their new powers to construct their own lines or may
have been considering switching to Neotel.
89
Initially the MNOs concentrated on the
construction of 3G and 3.5G radio networks utilising their expertise in the design
and construction of the radio access networks. However, by mid-2007, the MNOs
were busy constructing their own networks. 
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86 Department of Communications. Notice 1924 of 2004. Determination of dates in terms of the Telecommunications
Act. Government Gazette No 26763, 3 September 2004.
87 Telkom tried but failed to have the use of Internet Protocol (IP) declared part of its monopoly. 
88 Notice 1078 of 1993. Government Gazette No 15232, 29 October 1993.
89 Testimony of Mike Brierley at the Competition Tribunal on 19 May 2007 in the matter of the merger of Telkom SA
and BCX. 
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FIGURE 7: TELKOM DATA SERVICES REVENUES90 
Lines supplied to MNOs had been subject to the condition that they could be used
only for mobile telecommunications traffic and not for fixed network traffic. For
example, MTN Network Solutions had to construct a separate network to supply
customers of its fixed Virtual Private Network (VPN) services, despite already
operating a very large GSM and 3G network comprised of leased lines from Telkom.
91
There appear to have been discriminatory discounts on the condition that operators
not compete against Telkom in its fixed line business.
There was some controversy over the interpretation of the Ministerial Notice in
respect of whether VANS licensees were entitled to self-provide facilities. A press
release issued by the Minister in January 2006 – but necessarily carrying less weight
than a gazetted notice – cast doubt on this right.
92
As late as February 2007, the
Internet Service Providers Association (ISPA) issued an appeal to the Minister to
clarify the right to self-provisioning of infrastructure.
93
However, neither the Internet
Service Providers Association (ISPA) nor individual ISPs were willing to take the
Minister to court to clarify the meaning of the Notice.
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90 Telkom Financial Review, 2006, p. 106, and Telkom Group annual results March 2006, p. 16.
91 Testimony of Mike Brierley at the Competition Tribunal in the large merger Telkom and BCX. 
92 Ministry of Communications. Media statement. Matsepe-Casaburri – clarifying some ministerial determinations, 
31 January 2005.
93 http://www.ispa.org.za/news/press220207.shtml
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ICASA could not implement the Notice because the Minister refused to approve
VANS regulations that referred to self-provisioning. ICASA eventually resolved this
by omitting any reference to self-provisioning in the regulations.
94
The changes to the licences being made under the ECA may result in more service
providers being allowed to construct infrastructure and to resell excess capacity.
ICASA published a provisional framework for the conversion of licences suggesting
that the new licences could be generous.
95
Article 93 of the Act requires existing
licence holders to receive a new licence on “no less favourable terms” than their
existing licence. 
Gateway Communications expected to be able to convert its existing VANS licence
into licences for Electronic Communication Service (ECS) and Electronic
Communication Network Service (ECNS) licences.
96
If this happens it and other large
operators would certainly be allowed to construct their own infrastructure. However,
given the considerable costs, it would be likely to be only a few of the larger players




! MTN Network Solutions; and 
! Verizon.
Neotel and Telkom have been united in opposing the wider rights to construct
infrastructure since it would undermine their positions and the politically
determined duopoly.
The draft Ministerial direction of May 2007, set criteria under which ICASA might
issue ECNS licences enabling the construction of infrastructure.
97
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94 Government Notice. R. 490. Regulations for value-added network services. Government Gazette No 27608, 20 May
2005.
These supplemented the previous regulations:
Government Notice R 1384. Regulations relating to the manner in which applications for Value Added Network
Service (VANS) licences are to be made. Government Gazette No 25519, 1 October 2003. 
95 Notice 244. ICASA Conversion of licences in terms of Chapter 15 of the Electronic Communications Act (No 36 of
2005). Government Gazette No 29687, 7 March 2007. 
96 Paul Vecchiato. Gateway ups bandwidth capacity. ITWeb, 26 April 2007. 
http://www.itweb.co.za/sections/telecoms/2007/0704261037.asp
97 Government Notice 469. Electronic Communications Act (36/2005): Notice inviting comments on proposed policies
and policy directions. Government Gazette No 29923, 25 May 2007.
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Despite the confusion and uncertainty over the legality of self-provisioning and the
attempts by Telkom to contain rivals there is now evidence of alternative
infrastructure. However, it is too early to determine whether this competition
extends beyond core long-distance routes and a few metropolitan fibre rings. 
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Electronic Communications Act of 2005 was the result of several years of
discussion in Parliament over various drafts of a Convergence Bill. The Act
implemented a series of reforms intended to liberalise the telecommunications sector. 
In part, the Act drew on methods from the European Union legislative package.
98
However, South Africa had put in place only a fraction of the pro-competitive steps
taken by EU member states. Notably, it had yet to introduce cost-orientation for
incumbent operators providing leased lines, to open their provision to competitors
or to introduce effective reporting. 
The Act empowered ICASA to define relevant markets and then to regulate





! having control over essential facilities; and
! possessing a vertical relationship that could harm competition.
ICASA was to define the relevant markets, to determine the market shares and make
a forward looking assessment of market power. Based on this, it would then impose
one or more of the following “pro-competitive terms and conditions”:
! obligation to act fairly in requests for access, services and facilities;
! obligation to act timeously;
! prohibition against discrimination;
! obligation to publish information on terms and conditions;
! obligation to maintain separate and specified accounts;
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98 Paul Nihoul & Peter Rodford (2004) EU electronic communications law: competition and regulation in the
European telecommunications market. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
99 Article 67 of the Electronic Communications Act. 
100 The definition for this is taken from Section 7 of the Competition Act 1998: 
A firm is dominant in a market if –
(a) it has at least 45% of that market;
(b) it has at least 35%, but less than 45%, of that market, unless it can show that it does not have market power; or
(c) it has less than 35% of that market, but has market power.
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! price controls; and
! obligation to keep records. 
ICASA began the process of defining markets in January 2007, publishing a
consultation document on termination markets.
101
It then announced its intention to
define markets and the proposed remedies for leased lines and other fixed network
markets.
102
This consultation document raised a very wide range of issues including:
! opening access to the undersea cable;
! Carrier Selection (CS); 
! Carrier Pre-Selection (CPS); 
! Partial Private Circuits (PPCs);
! Local Loop Unbundling (ULL);
! Wholesale Line Rental (WLR); and
! Bitstream Access. 
These regulatory “products” were likely to be fiercely opposed by Telkom. Tackling
so many contentious problems at once tested the resources available to ICASA and
increased the risks of interlocking appeals. Accounting separation and the creation
of LRIC models would also be time-consuming. Draft market definitions were
published in late 2007, including domestic and international leased lines.
103
These
were followed by a draft measure for facilites leasing.
104
The Minister and ICASA have powers under Section 43 of the Act to regulate access to
undersea cable and landing stations. ICASA has proposed to designate undersea cable
landing stations as essential facilities.
105
This is clearly a matter of some priority, given
the concerns expressed by the President and imminence of the FIFA World Cup.
However, it is unclear how quickly or indeed how ICASA will act.
106
It has been
complicated by interventions by the Department of Communications, seeking to block
commercial rivals and those considered to have insufficient South African ownership. 
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101 ICASA. General Notice 78: Intention to define relevant wholesale call termination markets in terms of section 67 (4).
Government Gazette No 29568, 29 January 2007.
102 ICASA. General Notice 529: Intention to define relevant end to end leased lines and other wholesale markets in
terms of section 67 (4). Government Gazette No 29863, 3 May 2007. 
103 ICASA. General Notice 1809: Electronic Communications Act (36/2005): Regulations pursuant to section 67(4).
Government Gazette No 30622, 21 December 2007.
104 ICASA. General Notice 1794: Electronic Communications Act (36/2005): Electronic Communications Facilities
Leasing Regulations. Government Gazette No 30605, 24 December 2007.
105 ICASA. General Notice 1800: Electronic Communications Act (36/2005): Regulations prescribing a list of essential
facilities and matters related thereto. Government Gazette No 30612, 24 December 2007.
106 Steve Esselaar, Alison Gillwald and Ewan Sutherland (2007) The regulation of undersea cable landing stations.
LINK Centre Policy Paper. Johannesburg, University of the Witwatersrand. 
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The changes required by the ECA have imposed a very heavy burden on ICASA, of
which the work on leased lines is only a small part. The questions that arise concern
the priority assigned to the work and the time it is likely to take to complete the
processes, including the seemingly inevitable appeals. This could be worse, if tied up
with disputes over unbundling regulations. The process is more likely to take years,
than months. 
CONCLUSION
The government of South Africa has tried unsuccessfully to manage liberalisation,
with the intention of delivering more accessible and affordable telecommunications
services to support broad economic goals.
Leased lines are a primary input and cost factor for mobile network operators,
value-added and Internet service providers and are the basic building blocks of
corporate networks. Yet the supply of that infrastructure has been poorly managed
for over a decade. International comparisons suggest the prices are damagingly high
for the economy, while even Telkom admits the quality has not been good.
107
The prices of leased lines have not been controlled effectively, having initially been
allowed to rise to levels far in excess of costs and although they have since declined, it
has been very slow, so that they are still far from being cost-oriented. Telkom was able
to leverage its monopoly in the supply of infrastructure to extract substantial profits
from downstream operators, service providers and businesses. Moreover, there was no
regulatory effort to ensure that an adequate quality of service was delivered without
discrimination to all customers or even to monitor what was being provided. 
The failure on the one hand was not to introduce competitors and on the other was
not to determine the true level of costs. The Minister delayed the admittance of
competitors, while the regulator lacked the necessary independence, resources,
powers of enforcement and, most especially, information to regulate the incumbent.
The government and the minister created the system and then further compromised
the limited capability of ICASA by modifying its decisions. 
Under the Electronic Communications Act there is some prospect of prices being
brought towards cost, though only over a period of years. ICASA can now adopt
regulations without the approval of the minister, though she may still issue
directions which could have very similar effects. 
The competition that exists is limited to core routes between major cities. Local
access remains the effective monopoly of the incumbent. 
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107 Senior Counsel for Telkom before the Competition Tribunal in Telkom and BCX.
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Telkom has left no stone unturned to render regulation ineffective. It has lobbied
assiduously, taking advantage of the substantial Government shareholding. It has
contested decisions to have them overturned or to delay their implementation. It has
priced its own access lines differently and, in effect, more cheaply than those it
provides to rivals. It thwarted the development of a wholesale market by pushing
customers of service providers to buy access lines directly from itself
The introduction of self-provisioning of leased lines was inept, failing to encourage
investment in infrastructure. The Minister declared that it was permitted for VANS
operators to do so. She then appeared to withdraw permission in order to appease
Neotel which was finally becoming a plausible second network operator. Then ICASA
appeared to give permission by proposing wide-ranging licences to VANS providers.
Then the Minister intervened to limit this possibility. A rival Minister created a
competing state-owned operator to construct telecommunications infrastructure.
Telkom told the Competition Tribunal that it supported self-provisioning while filing
diametrically opposed views with ICASA. The degree of regulatory uncertainty
achieved has been quite remarkable, with the prospect of further litigation before
any new licences and regulations are finally settled.  
The adoption of parts of the regulatory approach developed in the European Union
– of the definition of relevant markets, their subsequent analysis and the imposition
of pro-competitive measures on dominant operators – appears to be premature and
overly ambitious. Moreover, that approach was designed for markets where
liberalisation was much further advanced. 
The transitional measures in South Africa appear dangerously weak and the risks of
regulatory delays and failures are considerable. It seems likely to take years rather
than months to bring fixed networks under effective regulation. The only alternative
would be to create a new statute with genuinely pro-competitive measures that would
not require further wasted years of implementation and litigation. "
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ANNEXE 1 – A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRICE CONTROLS
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White Paper on Telecommunications Policy.
Telecommunications Act 1996.
Section 45 – Power to regulate fees and charges. 
Section 96 – Power for the Authority to make regulations. 
Minister – Any rate regime during the ‘Exclusivity Period’ not to have a ‘material adverse
impact’ on Telkom or on its ability to fulfill the achievement of the roll-out and the new line
roll-out targets. (Terms as defined in the Telkom Licence.)
Minister – Imposition of CPI-X price cap on a basket of prices. Published price list to be the
maximum allowable charges. Individual basket elements limited to an increase of CPI + 20%.
SATRA becomes responsible for price control regulations. 
Independent Communications Authority of South Africa Act.
ICASA – assumes the powers previously held by SATRA.
ICASA – Review of the price control system.
ICASA – Proposal to limit price increases of ‘elements’ to CPI – X plus 5% (instead of 20%).
Creation of a separate residential sub-basket. 
ICASA – Draft price control regulations.
Minister – Price control regulations. Creation of a separate residential sub-basket. The ICASA
proposal, except for the productivity factor.
Telecommunications Amendment Act.
Amended Article 45 (2) to allow price control regulations beyond the initial three year period.
ICASA – Consultation on draft price regulations. The carry over to be limited to one year. 
Minister – Price control regulations. 
ICASA – Consultation on price control regulations, based on the first regulatory accounts
filed by Telkom. Telkom had achieved a reduction of average prices over four years of 6% in
real terms (after taking account of inflation). Addition of ADSL to the basket. Switch from
CPI to CPI-X.
ICASA – Draft price control regulations. 
ICASA – Invitation to public hearing on price controls. 
ICASA – Draft price control regulations. 
ICASA – Revision of the draft price control regulations.
Minister – Price control regulations. 
Minister – Withdrawal of 27752. 
Minister – Price control regulations. To run from 2006 to 2008. Continued use of CPI. 
Minister – Minor amendments to 27772. 
Electronic Communications Act. 
Section 97 repealed the Telecommunications Act 1996. 
Section 67(7)h includes price controls as one of the pro-competitive measures that ICASA
might impose on an operator identified as having Significant Market Power on a relevant
market. No longer to be approved by the Minister.




























X = productivity factor used in Equation 1.
078 107 leased lines sutherland sajic 04.qxp  2008/04/08  08:29 PM  Page 107
